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CLEARING THE ROADBLOCKS TO 
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS 
In 1986, approximately 24,000 people died in alcohol-related 
car accidents in the United States, a seven-percent increase over 
1985.1 An additional 650,000 individuals are injured in alcohol-
related motor vehicle accidents each year.2 This tragedy trans-
lates into economic costs to the American taxpayer that exceed 
$24 billion annually.3 
The average length of detention at a sobriety checkpoint" is 
approximately fifteen to thirty seconds.11 During that momentary 
detention, law enforcement officials observe the motorist for 
signs of intoxication. Studies conducted in California have 
shown that the overwhelming majority of drivers stopped at so-
briety checkpoints found this delay insignificant.6 Although the 
1. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, PROGRESS REPORT ON RECOMMEN-
DATIONS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING 6 (1987). The 
National Center for Statistics and Analysis of the National Highway Transportation 
Safety Adminstration (NHTSA) estimated that 23,990 people died in alcohol-related 
motor vehicle accidents in 1986, compared to 22,360 people in 1985. Id. 
2. Stacey, Drunken Driving Arrests Have Dropped Since '83, USA Today, Feb. 29, 
1988, at 5A, col. 1. 
3. Id. These costs include property damage, medical treatment, and legal costs. 
4. The term "sobriety checkpoint" is interchangeable with driving-while-intoxicated 
(DWI) roadblocks and driving-under-the-influence (DUI) roadblocks. This Note will use 
the label "sobriety checkpoint." 
5. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1327, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303, 241 Cal. 
Rptr. 42, 46 (1987) ("The average detention periods for those cars stopped was [sic] 28 
seconds."); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986) ("[M]otorists were detained for only 15 to 20 seconds, as long 
as there was no need for additional questioning."). 
6. D. Montagner, Operational Planning Section, Cal. Highway Patrol, Memorandum 
to Planning and Analysis Division (October 9, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. 
REF.). The memorandum reports results of a survey conducted from May through August 
1985, indicating strong public support for sobriety checkpoints. Table I shows the results 
of the survey, tabulating the responses on the 2,473 survey cards that were returned by 
drivers of vehicles that had been stopped at sobriety checkpoints in Bakersfield and 
North Sacramento. 
TABLE I 
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inconvenience is very small, courts have found that the deter-
rent effect of sobriety checkpoints is very great. 7 
This Note examines the constitutional and policy implications 
of sobriety checkpoints. Part I discusses the competing interests 
involved in implementing sobriety checkpoints. Part II presents 
an appropriate constitutional standard for judging sobriety 
checkpoints. Part III proposes reform-oriented measures that 
conform to constitutional guidelines. This Note concludes that 
properly conducted sobriety checkpoints are constitutional. 
I. COMPETING INTERESTS 
Sobriety checkpoints have proponents and detractors. Propo-
nents of sobriety checkpoints usually point to statistics showing 
that drunk driving is a serious problem.8 They argue that sobri-
ety checkpoints effectively deter and detect drunk drivers.9 
Although opponents of sobriety checkpoints concede that 
drunk driving is a serious problem, they argue that the road-
blocks violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.10 This Section examines the fac-
tors emphasized by both proponents and opponents of sobriety 
checkpoints. 
Do you approve of sobriety checkpoints as an enforcement measure to detect and remove 
drunk drivers from the highway? 
Yes 
87.1% 
Id. at 4. 
No 
9.3% 
7. See infra notes 21-22. 
Don't Know 
3.0% 
8. See supra notes 1-3, infra notes 11-19, and accompanying text. 
Unknown 
0.6% 
9. For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) contends that sobriety 
checkpoints are particularly effective at deterring drunk drivers. Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, Sobriety Checkpoints 2 (undated position paper) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. 
REF.). The reason for this, MADD posits, is that community awareness of the risk of 
arrest for drunk driving is heightened in those locales where sobriety checkpoints are 
implemented. As a result, the fear of arrest deters people from drinking and driving. 
MADD further cites the experiences of Delaware, Virginia, and the District of Columbia 
to show that the arrest "yield" of sobriety checkpoints can be equal to or exceed that of 
comparable resources used in traditional patrols. Id. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
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A. The State Interest in Preventing Drunk Driving 
The state has an overwhelming interest in eliminating drunk 
drivers from public roads. 11 Courts have described this interest 
as "compelling"12 and of "enormous magnitude,"13 and have rec-
ognized the problem of drunk driving as one of "epidemic pro-
portions. "1" Statistics demonstrate that the courts have good 
reason to use such strong language. In each year from 1982 
through 1986, the National Highway Transportation Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) estimates that over half of all fatal car 
accidents were alcohol-related.111 
One study analyzed over one million accidents and concluded 
that the proportion of fatalities among drunk drivers is 3.8 times 
greater than that among sober drivers.16 Another report esti-
mates that one out of every two people will be involved in an 
alcohol-related accident in his lifetime.17 
Alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents are characterized by 
certain patterns. Eighty-two percent of all fatal accidents occur 
between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.18 In some areas, it has been estimated 
that one out of every ten drivers is legally impaired or drunk on 
the typical weekend night.19 These factors demonstrate the exis-
tence of an opportunity to target specific times when the need to 
deter and detect drunk driving is greatest. 
Advocates of sobriety checkpoints argue that the roadblocks 
can and will reduce the casualty rate. 20 Many courts agree that 
sobriety checkpoints are an effective tool to combat drunk driv-
ing.21 In particular, the courts have found that the deterrent ef-
11. State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 536, 673 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1983); see also South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) ("The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well 
documented and needs no detailed recitation here."). 
12. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1068 (1986). 
13. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 536, 673 P.2d at 1181. 
14. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984). 
15. NATIONAL COMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 6 (citing the esti-
mates of NHTSA's National Center for Statistics and Analysis). 
16. Findlay, Drunks, Accidents: Fatal Mix, USA Today, Sept. 19-21, 1986, at IA, col. 
3. 
17. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, A Summary of Statistics Related to the National 
Drunk Driving Problem 1 (Aug. 1986) (unpublished collection of statistics) (copy on file 
with U. MICH J.L. REF.). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See Mothers Against Drunk Driving, supra note 9, at 1. 
21. See, e.g., Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505-06, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) ("[T]he 
pilot program had a substantial impact on the drunk driving problem. . . . The prospect 
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feet of sobriety checkpoints is singularly robust.22 A survey of 
motorists stopped at two sobriety checkpoints in California 
shows that drivers believe that checkpoints increase the likeli-
hood of detecting and arresting drunk drivers.23 Public percep-
tion is important because people who believe that drunk drivers 
will be caught are less likely to take the chance of driving while 
intoxicated. 
B. The Individual's Privacy Interest 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures."24 A 
seizure occurs when a person reasonably believes that he is not 
free to act as he chooses, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances.25 Although this criterion appears straightforward, 
it nonetheless causes the courts some difficulty.26 For the pur-
of being stopped at a roadblock thus convinced some intoxicated individuals to find al-
ternate means of transportation."). 
22. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48-49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 
(1984) (concluding that sobriety checkpoints might be no more efficient than roving pa-
trols at detecting drunk drivers, but finding that sobriety checkpoints were superior in 
deterring drunk driving); People v. Scott, 63 N1Y.2d 518, 527, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4-5, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 649, 652-53 (1984) (" '[T]he systematic, constitutionally conducted traffic 
checkpoint is the single most effective action in raising the community's perception of 
the risk of being detected and apprehended for drunk driving.'" (quoting the report of 
the Governor's Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force)). 
23. D. Montagner, supra note 6, at 4. Table II shows the survey results that were 
tabulated from 2,473 drivers that had been stopped at sobriety checkpoints. 
TABLE II 
Do you believe that sobriety checkpoints will increase a drunk driver's risk of being de-





















25. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1983) (applying the standard used by 
Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In Menden-
hall, Justice Stewart stated: "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, 
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 446 U.S. at 554. 
26. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding that when one member of 
a large group of INS agents approached a factory worker and began to ask two or three 
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pose of argument, this Note will assume that sobriety check-
points ordinarily result in fourth amendment seizures. The 
seizure occurs when a law enforcement official requires a vehicle 
to stop because he has arguably "seized" both the car and its 
occupants. 27 
The resulting question is whether the "seizure" of a vehicle at 
a sobriety checkpoint is a "reasonable" seizure under the fourth 
amendment.28 The traditional standard for measuring the rea-
sonableness of interfering with an individual's right to privacy is 
the demonstration of probable cause.29 Probable cause exists 
only when a law enforcement officer, using reasonable caution, 
confronts someone she believes is engaging in criminal activity.30 
The officer must know facts or circumstances that justify her be-
lief that the person either has committed, or is committing, a 
criminal offense. 31 
Without probable cause, only a brief and limited detention is 
authorized. 32 Such a detention must be no longer than necessary 
under the circumstances, 33 and must be no more intrusive than 
necessary to achieve its purpose.34 Accordingly, it is important to 
measure the extent to which sobriety checkpoints intrude upon 
accepted boundaries of privacy. 
Law enforcement procedures are not all equally intrusive upon 
privacy or individual liberties. For this reason, some seizures are 
constitutionally permissible although others are not. For exam-
ple, traffic signals cause the involuntary detention of motor vehi-
cles, resulting in delay and inconvenience to the driver. The con-
stitutional validity of traffic signals remains uncontested, 
however, because signals do not intrude upon individuals' rights 
to privacy. Moreover, because traffic signals cannot distinguish 
among motorists, they ensure a fair and impartial distribution of 
inconveniences. 
questions, the agent's behavior would not have led a reasonable man to believe that he 
was not free to leave without responding). 
27. Cf. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a 
seizure occurred although a driver was physically free to drive away, because the police 
showed sufficient authority to cause a reasonable driver to feel obliged to stop). 
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
29. For a discussion and definition of the probable cause standard, see Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). 
30. Id. To detain an individual, an officer is required to have reasonable grounds for 
her act. The officer's suspicion can be based either upon personal knowledge or upon 
information communicated to the officer by third parties. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
33. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1973). 
34. Id. 
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Toll booths at bridges and expressways also result in the in-
voluntary detention of motor vehicles. When a driver stops to 
pay a nominal sum for using a particular road segment, she may 
be subjected to the glances and surveillance of the booth atten-
dant. The attention paid to particular motorists is unlikely to be 
systematic. Nonetheless, the state does not stigmatize motorists 
by forcing them to stop at toll booths. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, the driver is secure in the knowledge that the 
booth attendant will treat each motorist similarly; toll booth at-
tendants rarely have discretionary powers. With this equal treat-
ment, no reasonable driver would feel stigmatized. Second, toll 
booths have gained wide public acceptance. 311 Sobriety check-
points can be administered analogously to toll booths. 36 
Courts also have noted that, because an automobile's occu-
pants and contents are at least partially visible to others on the 
roadway, a driver has a lower privacy expectation in his car than 
in his home or office. 37 It is unreasonable for someone driving on 
public roads to expect people to avert their eyes at the sight of 
an oncoming vehicle. 
II. MATCHING SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS WITH AN APPROPRIATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
This Section examines the constitutional tests courts employ 
to determine the appropriateness of various regulatory proce-
dures. These tests balance competing interests and investigate 
reasonableness. Using this approach, the United States Supreme 
Court has upheld some searches even where probable cause was 
conspicuously absent. The use of balancing was also a resonant 
feature in the Court's decision to uphold fixed border check-
points. That decision upheld searches that were conducted in 
the absence of individualized suspicion. Among the balancing 
tests articulated by the Court is the administrative-search 
framework. The Section concludes that sobriety checkpoints 
meet the requirements for classification as administrative 
searches. 
35. In this respect, they are similar to sobriety checkpoints. See supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
36. "[T]he humiliation implicit in being singled out as an object of suspicion is ab-
sent [from roadblocks)." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.5(a), at 549-50 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE 266 (1975)). 
37. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). 
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A. Balancing the Competing Interests 
Given the significant interests of both individual privacy and 
public safety, courts have suggested possible methods for choos-
ing between the competing interests. The United States Su-
preme Court suggests one possible framework in Terry v. Ohio.88 
In Terry, the Court held that probable cause is not a constitu-
tional prerequisite for conducting a stop-and-frisk.39 Even 
though a stop-and-frisk is unquestionably a seizure under the 
fourth amendment, the Court found that such a seizure might 
not be unreasonable;'0 The Court further held that the reason-
ableness of police conduct is a function of balancing the need to 
search or seize against the intrusion that such a search or seizure 
would cause.41 If the need to search or seize outweighs the corre-
sponding intrusion, then such a search or seizure is constitution-
ally permissible.42 The two key elements weighed in the balance 
were the protection that a stop-and-frisk affords a patrolling of-
ficer and the intrusiveness of a seizure used only to find 
weapons.43 
A drunk driver behind the wheel of a two-ton automobile is a 
person with a formidable weapon. Moreover, the goal of sobriety 
checkpoints is not only to protect patrolling officers, but also to 
protect the public in general. The problem with using the Terry 
rationale to justify sobriety checkpoints is that the checks are 
conducted in the absence of the requisite particularized facts 
and exigencies germane to a Terry frisk. For this reason, the fact 
pattern of sobriety checkpoints suggests that an alternative 
38. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court examined the constitutional standard gov-
erning the manner in which a police officer conducts a stop-and-frisk. The term "stop-
and-frisk" refers to limited protective searches conducted when an officer believes that a 
suspect might be armed. An example of a stop-and-frisk would be if an officer patted an 
individual's clothing in an attempt to discover dangerous weapons. See id. at 26. 
39. Id. at 27 ("[T]he issue is [instead] whether a reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger."). 
40. Id. at 26-28. The Court found that the officer's decision to conduct a stop-and-
frisk was reasonable based upon the officer's suspicion that the suspects were about to 
commit a robbery. This was so even if the officer did not have adequate information to 
take the suspects into custody for the purpose of prosecution. Id. 
41. Id. at 21. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 26. Searches must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies" that justify 
their initiation. Thus, in the case of the stop-and-frisk, the search "must be limited to 
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the 
officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 
'full' search." Id. 
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standard to the traditional Terry test might be more 
appropriate. 
In addition to Terry, the Court announced another fourth 
amendment test that fits the sobriety checkpoint situation more 
squarely. In these cases, courts look beyond the situation di-
rectly visible to the government agent engaging in a search and 
consider the net gain or loss to society that would result from 
using the specific search method.•• Thus, when evaluating the 
need for sobriety checkpoints at a particular location, it would 
be appropriate for a government official to consider empirical 
evidence that illustrates the extent of the drunk driving problem 
in the community. In these situations, courts look first to the 
amount of delay involved in the search.•11 Next, the courts look 
to the amount of discretion accorded the government agent 
making the search.•6 Under this general societal balancing, the 
Court, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, upheld fixed border 
checkpoints for immigration control. •7 This method of analysis 
has also led the Court to invalidate roving checks for valid 
driver's licenses in Delaware v. Prouseu as creating great poten-
tial for abuse. •9 
This standard appears to be a sensible method by which to 
judge the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. In fact, the 
Court specifically stated that "[q]uestioning of all oncoming 
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative" to the 
roving checks invalidated in Prouse.50 The Court reached this 
conclusion notwithstanding a simultaneous finding that stopping 
a vehicle and detaining its occupants was a "seizure" within the 
44. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) ("[W]e reject respondent's 
argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's 
personal observation .... "). 
45. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). In considering the 
question of whether permanent border checkpoints are consistent with the fourth 
amendment, the Court noted that border checkpoints resulted in only minimal interfer-
ence to legitimate traffic. Id. at 559. 
46. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) ("[Our] holding does not preclude 
the State of Delaware or other states from developing methods for spot checks that in-
volve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.") 
47. 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976) ("[W]e hold that the stops and questioning at issue 
may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located check-
points .... [T]he intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason 
need exist to justify it .... "). 
48. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
49. Id. at 662-63. 
50. Id. at 663. The Prouse case specifically deals with checks for driving licenses. The 
government interest in ensuring safe roadways, however, is served at least as well by 
preventing drunk driving as it is by keeping unlicensed drivers off the roads. 
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meaning of the fourth amendment.111 The Court upheld the fixed 
checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, noting that, although the check-
points operated without individualized suspicion and without 
advance judicial authorization, "the need to make routine check-
point stops is great, [and] the consequent intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment interests is quite limited."112 The Court noted that 
the checkpoint stops were principally limited to a brief question 
or two directed at the vehicle's driver, and that the level of vis-
ual inspection was significantly less than in a roving patrol 
stop.53 As the next section of this Note will argue, this analytical 
approach fits comfortably into the administrative search 
framework. 
B. Sobriety Checkpoints as Administrative Searches 
In Camara v. M!lnicipal Court, 5" the United States Supreme 
Court held that general-area building inspections require war-
rants, but that obtaining a warrant need not "depend upon spe-
cific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. "55 
Accordingly, health and safety inspectors were allowed to make 
routine inspections of various structures and dwellings.56 The 
Court found that such inspections were necessary to achieve 
widespread compliance with municipal codes.57 
Because it recognized the government's stake in preventing 
conditions that might endanger public health and safety,118 the 
Court found that the traditional test of probable cause was best 
viewed as a test to determine whether a particular general-area 
inspection was reasonable. 59 Thus, the Camara majority de-
scribed the need for inspection in terms of the reasonable goals 
of code enforcement.60 As the Court noted, balancing the overall 
51. Id. at 653. 
52. 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976). 
53. Id. at 558. 
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
55. Id. at 538. 
56. Id. ("[T]he area inspection is a 'reasonable' search of private property within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... "). 
57. Id. at 535-36 ("[T]he only effective way to seek universal compliance with the 
minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections 
of all structures."). 
58. Id. at 537. 
59. Id. at 538 ("[l]t is obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect 
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area 
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."). 
60. Id. at 537. 
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need to search against the invasion necessitated by such a search 
is the only appropriate test.81 Finally, the Camara Court con-
cluded that "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard"82 and 
stated, "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contem-
plated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted 
search warrant. "83 
The reasoning set forth in Camara has been used to analyze 
the constitutionality of a wide variety of general regulatory 
schemes designed to protect the public. For example, airport 
searches and screenings have been justified using the Camara 
rationale.8' In People v. Hyde, routine antihijack screening pro-
cedures were found reasonable despite the fact that probable 
cause was conspicuously absent.811 Although probable cause did 
not exist for each individual who passed through the airport, the 
court was able to balance the competing interests and found 
that the public's right to safe travel prevailed.88 
Application of the Camara holding has not been limited to 
airports. The administrative search rationale has been applied to 
food establishments,87 premises licensed to sell alcoholic bever-
ages,88 and pharmacies.89 In addition, inspections without indi-
vidualized suspicion have been upheld for junkyards,70 coal 
mines,71 and stores licensed to deal in sporting weapons.72 Fi-
61. Id. at 536-37. 
62. Id. at 539. 
63. Id. 
64. See People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974) (up-
holding predeparture screening of all passengers and carry-on baggage). 
65. Id. at 165, 524 P.2d at 834, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
[S)earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an 
administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure 
evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not 
supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or per-
son to be searched. 
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
66. Id. at 167, 524 P.2d at 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
67. State v. Phelps, 12 Ariz. App. 83, 467 P.2d 923 (1970). 
68. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
69. United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montayne, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(upholding inspections expressly limited to business hours, where health officials' author-
ity is not extended to forcible entry). 
70. State v. Wybierala, 305 Minn. 455, 459, 235 N.W.2d 197, 199-200 (1975) (holding 
that, where defendant is a licensed junk and secondhand dealer, regulations are particu-
larly needed because such shops are the places where thieves usually attempt to dispose 
of stolen property). 
71. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973) 
("The governmental interest in promoting mine safety, it might be concluded, far out-
weighs any interest the mine operators may have in privacy."). 
72. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). 
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nally, courts have approved administrative searches at truck 
weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints.73 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that where "reg-
ulatory inspections further [an] urgent ... interest, and the 
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impres-
sive dimensions, the inspection may proceed. "7• The key to a 
Camara-type administrative search is whether the particular 
government interest can be protected adequately by limiting 
searches solely to cases of individualized suspicion.n In People 
v. Hyde, the fact that "airline officials may have no particular-
ized suspicion [that] a prospective passenger is armed or danger-
ous does not operate to vitiate the search."76 The airport screen-
ings are generally conducted with courtesy and expediency, and 
alternative techniques are unlikely to yield much success.77 
The Camara Court examined three principal criteria to deter-
mine the appropriateness of an administrative inspection. First, 
the Court stated that such programs must have public accept-
ance. 78 In the case of sobriety checkpoints, the evidence suggests 
that drivers stopped at sobriety checkpoints approve of their 
use. 79 When this fact is combined with the burgeoning number 
of groups that vocally oppose drunk driving,80 and with the leg-
islative response to that public outcry, measures to combat 
drunk driving seem to have gained public acceptance. 
The second criterion developed by the Camara Court is 
whether an alternative canvassing technique that would achieve 
acceptable results is available.81 The almost 24,000 drunk-driv-
ing fatalities estimated to have occurred in 1986 demonstrate 
that acceptable results are not being achieved.82 Accordingly, 
73. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 n.26 (1979) (noting that the Court's 
holding does not cast doubt "on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and 
inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention"). 
74. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
75. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). As an example, the 
Court noted the difficulty of observing faulty wiring from outside a building. The Court 
found administrative inspections reasonable only when no other technique can achieve 
acceptable results. Id. 
76. People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 167, 524 P.2d 830, 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 
(1974). 
77. Id. Moreover, "it [is] impracticable, if not impossible, for airline officials to seek a 
search warrant for individual passengers." Id. at 168-69, 524 P.2d at 836, 115 Cal. Rptr. 
at 364. 
78. 387 U.S. at 537. 
79. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
80. Typical examples of those groups are Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Stu-
dents Against Drunk Driving. 
81. 387 U.S. at 537. 
82. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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there is a need to implement new measures to ensure compliance 
with laws that require motorists to act safely. 
The third criterion used by the Camara Court is that inspec-
tions must not be personal in nature.83 For example, in People v. 
Hyde, everyone entering the airport was equally subject to 
weapon screening.84 Camara further stated that such inspections 
must be aimed at preventing crimes rather than at their discov-
ery.86 Unfortunately, this requirement is somewhat ambiguous. 
The Camara Court applied it to building inspections despite the 
attachment of criminal sanctions to exposed violators.86 Simi-
larly, individuals who bring weapons into an airport in violation 
of the law face prosecution. Nonetheless, most courts have found 
sobriety checkpoints more effective at deterring drunk driving 
than at detecting drunk drivers for the purposes of arrest and 
prosecution. 87 
Sobriety checkpoints are closely analogous to other searches 
that the Court has subjected to administrative-search scrutiny. 
It is thus appropriate to apply the administrative-search frame-
work to sobriety checkpoints. Sobriety checkpoints meet each of 
the criteria delineated in Camara. As a consequence, sobriety 
checkpoints qualify as constitutional administrative searches. 
Ill. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
New strategies are necessary because of the inability of cur-
rent law enforcement methods to curtail drunk driving suffi-
ciently. Sobriety checkpoints alone will not solve the problem. 
Rather, a comprehensive program designed to reduce drunk 
driving must be enacted. Although sobriety checkpoints are only 
one aspect of such a program, they are nevertheless an impor-
tant component. 
The Constitution requires more than merely demonstrating a 
great state interest to override fourth amendment concerns. 
Even demonstrating that a particular law enforcement technique 
results in social gain, as measured by a cost-benefit test, is insuf-
ficient to secure its constitutionality. Instead, the fourth amend-
ment requires that the government use the least intrusive means 
83. 387 U.S. at 537. 
84. 12 Cal. 3d at 169, 524 P.2d at 837, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 365. 
85. 387 U.S. at 537. 
86. 387 U.S. at 531 (noting that discovery of a violation during an administrative 
search often leads to a criminal complaint). 
87. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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available to correct the problem in question. When implement-
ing sobriety checkpoints, binding guidelines are necessary to 
minimize checkpoint variation and officer discretion. Similarly, 
the· Constitution requires minimal inconvenience to the motor-
ist. Only with such restrictions can courts find sobriety check-
points constitutional. 
A. Use of Alternative Programs 
Sobriety checkpoints are needed to achieve "acceptable re-
sults" in the fight against drunk driving88 because roving patrols 
and other enforcement mechanisms have failed to reduce suffi-
ciently the dangers created by drunk driving.89 One argument 
favoring the use of checkpoints emphasizes that the drunk and 
erratic driver may cause injury before he is spotted by a roving 
patrol car. Another is based on the claim that it is difficult to 
spot a drunk driver. This difficulty may increase in heavy traffic 
or at night. Many drunk drivers, although able to avoid conspic-
uously erratic movements, are nonetheless driving with an im-
paired ability so that they do not have the necessary reflexes to 
respond adequately to the sudden changes in the environment 
that drivers regularly face. 90 
As a result of the difficulty in spotting drunk drivers, it is nec-
essary to implement a host of auxiliary programs to detect and 
deter drunk driving. A program may limit the availability of al-
cohol by increasing age restrictions on alcohol purchases and 
88. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
90. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1068 (1986). 
Id. 
[T]he ability of a drunk driver to avoid erratic movements along a roadway does 
not mean he will be able to respond to an emergency where prompt reflexes may 
be of great importance .... [Given that) the carnage caused by drinking and 
then driving is so serious it warrants resort to both types of apprehension -
stopping automobiles which are being driven erratically and roadblocks to detect 
drunken drivers before they drive in an erratic manner. 
Professor LaFave has noted that: 
[E]ven .if a patrolling officer is fortunate enough to be in the vicinity where a 
drunk driver is operating his vehicle, it does not necessarily follow that the 
driver will at that particular time drive his car in such a fashion as to create a 
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. And the chances of such observation in 
the first place are rather slight, given the substantial number of intoxicated driv-
ers on the roads. 
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 10.8(d), at 72-73. 
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thereby reducing drunk driving among youths.B1 Similarly, 
dramshop and social-host liability legislation may encourage 
those who serve alcohol to act responsibly.B2 It is also necessary, 
however, to deter those individuals who have ready access to al-
cohol. When such individuals decide to drink and drive, the de-
cision usually involves some consideration of the risk involved. 
Although typical drivers may conclude that "they can handle 
it," drivers may be less sure they can avoid detection by govern-
ment authorities if an effective checkpoint program exists. 
As part of a comprehensive program to combat drunk driving, 
sobriety checkpoints serve to deter and detect drunk drivers. 
The fear of arrest often reduces the frequency with which occa-
sional offenders drive under the influence of alcohol. One reason 
that the driver may be less willing to drive drunk is the likeli-
hood of heavy punishment if convicted. Thus, stiff sentences 
will, to an extent, help reduce the number of individuals who 
drive while inebriated. For this reason, fourteen states impose 
mandatory sentences on first-time drunk drivers.B3 Eighteen 
states even refuse to permit plea-bargaining in driving-while-in-
toxicated cases. 94 Individuals may fear exposure and conviction 
almost as much as the criminal penalty itself, particularly if the 
penalty for first-time offenders is less severe. As educational pro-
grams become more effective and social mores change, it is prob-
able that communities will take drunk driving more seriously. 
Perhaps then drunk drivers will be treated like other violent 
criminals. Still, the number of arrests resulting from a particular 
measure should not be the sole criterion used to gauge the suc-
cess of the technique or methodology employed.B11 Rather, it is at 
91. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 4. Forty-nine 
states now require purchasers of alcohol to be at least 21 years old. Id. See also Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving, Research on Teens - Drinking & Drugs & Driving 1 (Aug. 1986) 
(citing NHTSA statistics showing that driving while alcohol-impaired is the leading 
cause of death for individuals aged 16 to 24). 
92. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 4. Twenty-five 
states have dramshop statutes. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986). 
The National Transportation Safety Board's Safety Study on deterrence of 
drunk driving recognizes the deterrent potential of drunk-driving roadblocks. 
The study points out that they preclude drunk drivers from assuming they will 
escape trouble simply by driving cautiously. In addition, the study points out 
that sobriety checkpoints are visible aspects that drunk driving is being com-
bated and they afford police the opportunity to observe a larger number of mo-
torists than would be possible during typical patrol procedures. Admittedly the 
possibility that a driver will face a roadblock on his way home will not discour-
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least as important to deter drunk drivers in the first place. To 
this end, sobriety checkpoints will "preclude drunk drivers from 
assuming they will escape trouble simply by driving cau-
tiously."98 Moreover, sobriety checkpoints reinforce the message 
that government takes drunk driving seriously because check-
points serve as a visible warning to both drunk drivers and sober 
drivers who contemplate driving in an impaired state. 
B. Minimizing Discretion and Variation 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here a 
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests 
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, 
we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."97 However, as 
the Court. suggested in Delaware v. Prouse, one condition on 
which reasonableness may depend is the level of unbridled dis-
cretion attaching to a particular checkpoint program. 98 
In a recent case, Ingersoll v. Palmer, 99 the California Supreme 
Court upheld the use of sobriety checkpoints.100 The court held 
that, "while the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint stop is 
not trivial, the enumerated safeguards [in the case] operate to 
minimize the intrusiveness to the extent possible. "101 Thus, the 
court declared that, "[o]n balance, the intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment interests is sufficiently circumscribed so that it is 
easily outweighed and justified by the magnitude of the drunk 
driving menace and the potential for deterrence."102 For the bal-
ance to tilt in favor of sobriety checkpoints, the Ingersoll court 
Id. 
age all drunk driving, but on the basis of common sense alone one must conclude 
that many persons aware of that prospect will have second thoughts about 
[drinking and] driving. 
96. Id. 
97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (discussing the application of the 
fourth amendment to school search cases). 
98. 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
99. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987). 
100. Id. at 1350, 743 P.2d at 1319, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 62. The California Supreme 
Court subsequently used Ingersoll as its basis for vacating a 1986 California appellate 
opinion that found sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional. In Re Richard T., 44 Cal. 3d 
775, 750 P.2d 297, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Richard T. v. Califor-
nia 57 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1988) (No. 88-318). See also Savage, Roadblocks to 
Check Driver Sobriety OKd, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (discussing the 
United States Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari in the Richard T. case). 
101. 43 Cal.3d at 1347, 743 P.2d at 1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60. 
102. Id. 
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emphasized two essential factors: (1) decisionmaking must be 
made at the supervisory level, and (2) discretion of field officers 
must be limited.103 These factors decrease the danger of arbi-
trary and capricious enforcement.104 Most other states upholding 
the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints have also empha-
sized the need for checkpoint operations to follow a plan drafted 
in advance by supervisory personnel. 1011 
Perhaps of paramount importance is eliminating officer discre-
tion with regard to selectivity in stopping motorists. Discretion 
allows roadblocks to act as the functional equivalent of roving 
patrols. To this end, the California Supreme Court mandated 
that sobriety checkpoints either stop all motorists or every mo-
torist at a fixed interval (e.g., every fifth car).106 Similarly, field 
officers must be required to treat all motorists equally until 
probable cause of an offense is established.107 
Courts should review the promulgated guidelines.108 This is 
consistent with the theory that field officers should follow care-
fully drafted guidelines delineating checkpoint procedures, in-
cluding substantial planning and briefing. An administrative 
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate or judge should 
be required in advance of implementing a sobriety checkpoint. 
The magistrate or judge should ensure that both officer discre-
tion and motorist inconvenience are minimized. Since the sobri-
103. Id. at 1341-42, 743 P.2d at 1313-14, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57. 
104. See id. at 1342, 743 P.2d at 1313, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57. 
105. See, e.g., Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984). In Little, 
comprehensive regulations were reviewed first by the Superintendent of the Maryland 
State Police and then by the Attorney General and the Governor. See also State v. Supe-
rior Court, 14:cl Ariz. 45, 46-47, 691 P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1984) (including a detailed com-
mand directive prepared by the Commander of the Traffic Enforcement Division of the 
Tucson Police Department outlining guidelines for officer behavior and procedures for 
operating the checkpoint); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 89, 483 N.E.2d 
1102, 1107 (1985) (holding that the guidelines for officer behavior contained ample provi-
sions to ensure safety and minimal inconvenience to motorists and also clearly pro-
scribed the arbitrary selection of vehicles); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 351, 337 
S.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986) (finding that officers as-
signed to roadblocks were given 24 hours of training and a manual signed by the Chief of 
Police listing checkpoint locations, assignment of personnel, safety provisions, interview-
ing procedures, and other aspects of a detailed routine). 
106. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1342, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr. 
42, 57 (1987) (holding that a "neutral mathematical selection criteria" should be 
employed). 
107. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). "[A]ny further de-
tention ... must be based on consent or probable cause." Id. at 567 (quoting United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)). 
108. See Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986) (answering a re-
quest of the New Hampshire House of Representatives and holding constitutional sobri-
ety checkpoints that were subject to a system of independent review by a neutral and 
detached magistrate). 
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ety checkpoint is, by definition, implemented without individu-
alized suspicion, the same exigency as often exists in other cases 
is not present. Thus, subjecting sobriety checkpoints to the de-
lays involved in obtaining an administrative warrant will not de-
tract from their effectiveness. 
C. Minimizing Inconvenience 
In Ingersoll u. Palmer, the California Supreme Court identi-
fied several factors essential to the smooth administration of a 
sobriety checkpoint.1°9 The constitutionality of a sobriety check-
point depends in part upon the checkpoint's performance in 
these categories, as the Constitution requires that the govern-
ment not interfere with individuals' lives any more than is nec-
essary. The factors cited by the California Supreme Court are: 
(1) the checkpoint must be reasonably located; (2) the time and 
duration of the checkpoint must be set in good judgment; (3) 
indications of the official nature of the roadblock must be pres-
ent; (4) the average time each motorist is detained must be min-
imized; and (5) advance publicity must accompany the institu-
tion of each checkpoint. 110 
The smooth operation of sobriety checkpoints requires trained 
officers. The training may involve drills where officers practice 
asking brief questions to stopped drivers. It may also include 
teaching officers how to offer literature to passing driversm or 
how to shine a flashlight in the vicinity of the driver to deter-
mine the driver's condition.112 To ensure the constitutionality of 
the seizures, the supervisory guidelines must place adequate re-
strictions both on how the field officers observe the drivers and 
on how they question them.113 
The location of the checkpoint is important for two reasons. 
First, the checkpoint should not unduly interfere with the safe 
flow of traffic.114 This consideration also requires other features, 
109. 43 Cal. 3d at 1342-47, 743 P.2d at 1314-1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57-60. 
110. Id. 
111. See Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 351, 337 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1327, 743 
P.2d 1299, 1303, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (noting that the screening officer handed each 
driver stopped an information flyer). 
112. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986). 
113. See supra note 111. 
114. See State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 583, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980). 
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such as adequate lighting. m Second, the government interest in 
implementing sobriety checkpoints is strongest on those roads 
known to have high accident rates resulting from drunk 
driving.116 
Sobriety checkpoints should be clearly marked as official po-
lice stopping points to reduce potential fear and anxiety of pass-
ing motorists. Uniformed officers should be visible to approach-
ing motorists to assure drivers that the checkpoint is 
legitimate.117 In addition, advance publicity on the general use 
of sobriety checkpoints will prevent unnecessary surprise and 
confusion to motorists.118 The publicity will also have the valu-
able side-effect of deterring drunk driving. 119 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The average length of detention at a sobriety checkpoint is 
approximately fifteen to thirty seconds. 120 Drunk driving results 
annually in thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of inju-
ries, and billions of dollars in property damage.121 These com-
peting interests must be balanced in order to assess the desira-
bility of sobriety checkpoints. These are also the factors weighed 
in the constitutional balancing test of the fourth amendment. 
The application of a warrant-based administrative search 
must be limited to an evenhanded, uniformly administered in-
spection. Where unnecessary police officer discretion or check-
point variation exists, the checkpoint cannot survive constitu-
tional objections. This means that if an officer asks a motorist to 
pull to the side, or to step outside of his car, the officer is obliged 
to demonstrate probable cause based on individualized circum-
115. See Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 90, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1109 (1985) 
(discussing the need for signs, flares, and flashing lights). 
116. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1343, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr. 
42, 58 (1987); see also People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986). The time that the checkpoint operates is also impor-
tant. The court notes that "the frequency of violations is known to increase at night and 
· particularly as patrons return from drinking establishments which have just closed." Id. 
117. 43 Cal. 3d at 1345, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59; see People v. Peil, 122 
Misc. 2d 617, 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (1984) (discussing use of uniformed deputy 
sheriff). 
118. 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60. 
119. Id. 
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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stances.122 Similarly, inconveniences to motorists must be 
minimized. 
The ultimate decision whether to implement sobriety check-
points must be based on their effectiveness. The degree of effec-
tiveness is a critical factor in assessing both policy and constitu-
tional considerations. In measuring effectiveness, however, it is 
important to remember that the appropriate variable is not the 
number of arrests made, but rather the number of lives saved. 123 
-Mark R. Soble 
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra notes 9, 22, 95, and accompanying text. 

